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LIBRATIONIST CLOSURES OF THE PARADOXES
Abstract: We present a semi-formal foundational theory of sorts, akin to sets,
named librationism because of its way of dealing with paradoxes. Its semantics
is related to Herzbergers semi inductive approach, it is negation complete and
free variables (noemata) name sorts. Librationism deals with paradoxes in a
novel way related to paraconsistent dialetheic approaches, but we think of it as
bialethic and parasistent. Classical logical theorems are retained, and none con-
tradicted. Novel inferential principles make recourse to theoremhood and failure
of theoremhood. Identity is introduced à la Leibniz-Russell, and librationism is
highly non-extensional.  11 -comprehension with ordinary Bar-Induction is ac-
counted for (to be lifted). Power sorts are generally paradoxical, and Cantors
Theorem is blocked as a camouaged premise is naturally discarded.
Keywords: Bialethism, Burali-Forti Paradox, Cantors Theorem, Currys Para-
dox, Dialetheism, Foundations of Mathematics, Liars Paradox, Paraconsistency,
Parasistency, Paradoxes, Reverse Mathematics, Russells Paradox, Second Or-
der Arithmetic, Semantical paradoxes, Set Theoretic Paradoxes, Set Theory,
Theory of Truth.
§0 Introduction
In the following we present some of the main features of the librationist founda-
tional system, with emphasis upon its dealing with paradoxes and its provision
of an alternative foundation for mathematics. Librationism has its new-coined
name from the word libration, which the reader is asked to look up if unfa-
miliar. This replaces the term liberalismwhich was used in some superseded
publications and lectures on account of the theorys emancipatory feature that
all abstraction terms are allowed. The new name, which was available, is meant
to also remind of the oscillating manner of its dealing with paradoxical phe-
nomena. According to recent nomenclature, librationism could be considered
a theory of properties. Confer the inuential opening remark of [15]: Gödel
said to me more than once "There never were any set-theoretic paradoxes, but
the property-theoretic paradoxes are still unresolved"; and he may well have
said the same thing in print.This author agrees with Gödels attitude that the
word setshould best be reserved for those in the more iterative, extensional
and non-paradoxical sense, and the term property-theoretic paradox is very
appropriate and useful in the sense that it points out that there are other ob-
jects than iterative and extensional sets which succumb to triviality when naïve
abstraction is brought into play to understand them. However, it does not fol-
low that the term property theory is an appropriate term for such theories
that endeavor to understand objects which are appropriately analyzed by those
means which suggest themselves in approximating naïve abstraction. This is
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because there are many properties, like the property of having pain, which for
obvious reasons cannot conceivably be dealt with in such frameworks. On the
basis of such grounds as these we steer a middle way and understand the theory
to be developed in this essay as a theory of sorts. All sorts may be regarded as
properties, but not vice versa. All sets in a more classical sense, as far as their
existence is supported by librationism, are sorts, but not vice versa. It is not
known to what extent librationism supports the existence of sets. The libra-
tionist theory of sorts supports the existence of non-well founded sorts, and also
contains universal sorts; librationism is a highly non-extensional theory, and it
e.g. turns out that there are innitely many distinct non-paradoxical empty,
and hence also universal sorts. One should keep in mind that in librationism,
all conditions give rise to a corresponding sort. We are able to isolate a sort
H of hereditarily non-paradoxical and iterative sorts. With respect to H we
may in some contexts use bi-simulation to recapture extensionality and other
desirable principles, e.g. concerning ordinals. Results so far have established
that we by using manifestation-points (see §6) can establish that librationism
gives an interpretation of nitely iterated inductive denitions ID! plus the
Bar-rule; librationism is therefore stronger than the impredicative subsystem of
second order arithmetic  11   CA0 + ordinary Bar-Induction in a sense to be
made more precise.1 This will be lifted.
The language of librationism may succinctly but just approximately be de-
scribed as that of ordinary set theory extended with a truth operator T. There
are ve caveats concerning this which we draw attention to here: Firstly, the
terms of our language are taken to denote sorts. Secondly, the truth operator
is eliminable as concerns the purely sort theoretic aspects of librationism, but
it facilitates presentation and is of importance e.g. if and when we extend the
theory with a truth predicate. Thirdly, sort brackets are included in what we
here took as the language of ordinary set theory, and these are not eliminable in
librationist sort theory as in extensional set theories. Fourthly, the identity sign
=is not taken as a primitive sign in the librationist language, as a Leibnizian
denition of identity with Russells simplication can be shown to be adequate.
Fifthly, in the presentation we give below we dene the primitive language more
austerely in a Polish manner for metalogical and, as we shall see, philosophical
reasons.
Librationism may be understood as an heir both to the semi-inductive type
of approach to semantic paradoxes originating with [11, 12] ([9] independently
suggested the very much related revision theory at the same time) as well as
to some tenets of various paraconsistent points of view. In our semantics, it
is of vital importance that we x our focus on one designated model, and in
our setup what is usually regarded as free variables serve as names of sorts via
an enumeration of these in the metalanguage. But then the expression variable
in such contexts is very much misleading indeed, and so we instead opt for
using the expressions noema (singular) and noemata (plural). This is inter alia
1Readers unfamiliar with the invoked notions related to reverse mathematics are advised
to consult the now classical [16]. The Wikipedia entry on Reverse Mathematics can also be a
good place to start gaining some familiarity with central notions.
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justied by the fact that one meaning of the word noema as listed in the Oxford
English Dictionary is: A gure of speech whereby something stated obscurely is
nevertheless intended to be understood or worked out. Also, the Greek letter 
in the original Greek word o typographically very much resembles lower
case v.
In the Herzberger process we invoke, all sorts have the empty extension at
the ordinal zero; this is not an essential assumption from a formal point of
view (other consistent beginnings could, so seen, serve as well), and one may
think of the version we develop as minimalist librationism. The author thinks
that minimalistic librationism is preferable to other variants of librationism for
philosophical and, if that is di¤erent here, esthetical reasons. The minimalist
policy also has the advantage of justifying the regularity rule for hereditarily
kind and iterative sorts (cfr. §9).
Herzbergers semi inductive semantics was geared towards dealing with the
semantic Liars paradoxes with a self referential truth predicate. But he was
aware of the possibility of using the same type of semantics for what we call a sort
theory. In footnote 11 of [12] this is stated very clearly: Similar questions might
be raised in set theory by applying semi-inductive methods to the construction
of the membership relation.Our approach may be seen as following this line
of research, but as well extending it e.g. with including innitary inferential
principles (see below).
We take as librationistically valid all those formulas that hold unbound-
edly below the closure ordinal reached in the designated Herzberger process
described. This contrasts with what would in this context have been the stan-
dard semi inductive approach, as it would, in this way of expressing things, have
taken as valid all and only those formulas whose negations are not unbounded
under the closure ordinal. If we assume the ordinals used are von Neumann
ordinals, we may state this alternatively by saying that a formula is librationis-
tically valid i¤ the union of the set of those ordinals below the closure ordinal
where it holds is the closure ordinal. With the same assumption, a formula is
valid according to the standard semi inductive approach i¤ the union of the set
of ordinals where the negation of the formula holds is smaller than the closure
ordinal. We may, as is usual, take a formula to be stably in (stably out) i¤
there is an ordinal  below the closure ordinal such that it (its negation) holds
at all ordinals  larger than  and below the closure ordinal. A formula is un-
stable i¤ it is neither stably in nor stably out. According to a standard semi
inductive approach, a formula will be counted as valid i¤ stably in. From the
librationist viewpoint put forward here, a formula is counted as valid i¤ stably
in or unstable; only formulas stably out are discounted in librationism.
We will at this point illustrate the di¤erence with a couple of examples, and
we rst consider predicate logical tautologies. Classical logical theorems hold at
all ordinals in the Herzberger process, and negations of such theorems fail at all
ordinals. So theorems of classical logic are librationistically valid, and negations
of theorems of classical logic are not. In the standard semi inductive approach,
classical logical theorems are valid because the set of ordinals where the negation
of any such theorem holds in the Herzberger process is just the empty set, and
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negations of classical theorems are not valid because the set of ordinals in the
Herzberger process where their negations hold is unbounded under the closure
ordinal. We next consider r 2 r, with r = fx : x =2 xg. Given our semantic
setup with our alethic comprehension principle, we here have that if r 2 r holds
at an ordinal then r =2 r holds at its successor, and r =2 r holds at an ordinal
only if r 2 r holds at the next ordinal. So both the set of ordinals where r 2 r
holds below the closure ordinal as well as the set of ordinals where r =2 r holds
below the closure ordinal are unbounded under the closure ordinal, and so both
r 2 r and r =2 r are librationistically valid. According to the standard semi
inductive approach, neither r 2 r nor r =2 r is valid.
We write  A for the statement that A is librationistically valid, and call the
symbol the roadstyle when referred to. As pointed out, if A is a theorem
of classical logic then  A and not  A, whereas, for r = fx : x =2 xg, we have
that  r 2 r as well as  r =2 r. On account of this, we distinguish between
maxims that are theorems whose negations are not theorems, and minors which
are theorems that are not maxims. Theorems of classical logic are examples of
maxims, and r 2 r for r = fx : x =2 xg an example of a minor. We say that
a schema is minor if all its instances are theorems and it has minor instances,
and a schema is maximal if all its instances are maxims. M A signies that A
is a maxim, and m A means that A is a minor. We use the roadstyle without
subscript if it is left undecided whether the theorem is a maxim or a minor.
We here stress that the induced inference rules for librationism are novel,
and that e.g. modus ponens for  is not a valid inference rule. This will be
covered precisely below, but needs mentioning here in order to forestall hasty
dismissals.
We have seen that both r 2 r and r =2 r are librationist theorems. This does
not mean, however, that r 2 r ^ r =2 r is a librationist theorem, as, quite on
the contrary, r 2 r _ r =2 r is a maxim. To forestall irrelevant objections ap-
pealing to something like what is thought of as the one and only true meaning
of connectives, we suggest that the skeptical reader e.g. presupposes the fol-
lowing slightly alternative names to the most common connectives used in the
main bulk of this presentation of librationism: negjunction (), adjunction (^),
veljunction (_), subjunction () and equijunction (). The rst of these names
is a seemingly etymologically justied neologicism whose pronunciation is not
too far o¤ from negation. The last name returned some very few occurrences
with the intended meaning of material equivalence on an internet search. The
name veljunctionis sometimes, but very rarely used for disjunction, and ad-
junctionperhaps even more rarely for conjunction. It seems that subjunction
has come to be used sometimes in grammar literature for material conditionals
and their cognates. (In some logic literature subjunctive conditionalis taken
to refer to a conditional akin to the counterfactual conditional.)
The reader may associate with these di¤erent names for connectives in the
librationist setting in part to avoid the prejudice that these are to be thought
of as gaining their meanings from purely truth functional considerations. We
will not adhere strictly to this in our own presentation. As in standard theories,
the meaning of connectives in librationism must be understood syncategore-
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matically, as the schoolmen would have expressed it; this is to say that they
do not have a meaning in virtue of a denotatum, but rather obtain one from
their appropriate use in conjunction with other formulas. But, importantly,
some pretheorethically expected usages fail in librationism. We cannot, e.g.,
infer from  A to not  A, nor vice versa, as in a standard semantical frame-
work. Nor do we always have adjunctivity for theoremhood, i.e. that  A
and  B only if  A ^ B, and so in this single respect there is a resemblance
between librationism and Stanislaw Jaskowskis non-adjunctive paraconsistent
system. And yet the standard interdenablity connections between connectives
hold maximally.
Librationism is a semi-formal system. An important di¤erence e.g. between
Peano arithmetic and omega logic, i.e. Peano arithmetic with the omega rule,
is that the latter is quite categorical with respect to content. For this reason we
use the expression contentual system as synonymous with, or as a replacement
for, semi-formal system. This neologism seems to t the analogous distinc-
tion between form and content appropriately in our context. Also, the term
semi-formal does not seem to carry important information. However, on many
occasions semi-formal is used parenthetically as a reminder.
The contentual (semi-formal) system librationism is not recursively axioma-
tizable, but it serves to isolate many partial formal systems. It is important in
this connection to point out the validity of what we, in analogy with the !-rule,
by picking the last letter of the Latin alphabet, call the Z-rule: from M A(v)
for all noemata (free variables) v, infer M 8xA(x). The intuitive and prima
facie weaker inntary rule that M 8xA(x) holds if M A(t) holds for all terms
t entails the Z-rule given the facts that noemata (free variables) in librationism
are names of sorts and all sorts are named. The corresponding rules with no
subscript or minor subscript are not validated.
As noemata (free variables) serve as names of sorts we may e.g. have that
 v37 = fv3 : v3 2 v3g. But generalizing this would of course be absurd. In
stating partial axiomatic schemas which do allow generalization, the precaution
is taken that all generalizations of the stated schemas are also axioms. A simple
inductive argument going back to Tarski shows that generalization will hold as
a derived inference rule for the partial systems consisting of such schemas as
here described.
The validity of the Z-rule makes it the case that librationism veries the
consistency not only of a wide range of rst order axiomatizable theories such
as Peano arithmetic, but also much stronger theories. In this there is nothing
whatsoever which detracts from Gödels seminal insights, as librationism itself is
not recursively axiomatizable. Indeed, it is important to stress that we in libra-
tionism always see things from a semantical point of view. Thence traditional
soundness and completeness considerations are inappropriate in the librationist
setting. The axiomatic and inferential principles of librationism which we are
able to isolate are therefore always partial.
Librationism may be regarded as a paraconsistent system given contempo-
rary terminology, but the reader is asked to pay attention to the very signicant
di¤erences between it and such frameworks. The author also has some impor-
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tant issues with the nomenclature in the area as concerns librationism (and
not only for etymological reasons) and thinks parasistent, which etymologically
signies the property of standing up beyond, is a much more suitable term
than paraconsistent, which etymologically rather seems to signify the property
of being beyond a safe place to stand.
Provided a theory is regarded as inconsistent i¤ it has theorems of the form
A^  A, then librationism is a consistent theory. We will conform to this usage,
and consider librationism consistent.
There is then the question of whether librationism should be considered a
contradictory theory on account of the fact that for some sentences A both  A
and  A. Pragmatic considerations here strongly suggest that we should avoid
the term contradictory if at all possible, for it seems not to be in accordance
with commonly adopted standards for language and rationality that a theory
contradicts itself. It is important in this to pay attention to the fact that
standard usage has it that if two sentences are contradictory then it is impossible
for both to be true.
And closer inspection indeed suggests that a contradiction need not be
thought to be involved here. We do not, in librationism, commit ourselves
to the idea that the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction fails in para-
doxical contexts. Let the signicance of a formula be the set of ordinals below
the closure ordinal where it holds in the Herzberger process. A formula is then
librationistically valid just in case the union of its signicance is the closure
ordinal (assuming von Neumann ordinals). When we have both  A and  A,
what we have is that the two sentences A and  A have what we take to be
complementary signicances in the sense that the union of these signicances is
the closure ordinal itself, their intersection is empty and both signicances are
unbounded under the closure ordinal. We think of sentences as contradictory
just in case the union of their signicance is the closure ordinal, the intersec-
tion of their signicances is empty and it is not the case that both signicances
are unbound under the closure ordinal. Contradictory and complementary sen-
tences as A and  A are always incompatible in the sense that their conjunction
(adjunction) must fail to be a librationist theorem.
With this as background we can o¤er a librationist diagnosis of why it is
wrong to assert A as well as to assert v A when A and v A are contradictory;
this is because exactly one of A and v A is false. Similarly, we see that if A and
v A are complementary, then they are both true from the librationist point of
view; so we can in this case truthfully assert A as well as truthfully assert v A.
It is worthwhile to point out and emphasize that our connectives behave
quite classically when regarded as operating upon the signicances of formulas.
Given the signicances of formulas A and B as the sets of ordinals below the
closure ordinal where they hold, the signicance of  A is the complement of the
signicance of A relative to the closure ordinal, the signicance of A _B is the
union of the signicance of A with the signicance of B and the signicance of
A^B is the intersection of the signicance of A with the signicance of B. The
signicance of subjunctions and equijunctions are dened similarly according to
their standard denitions in terms of other connectives. The signicance of e.g.
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TA given that of A is more complicated to express, and these two will always
di¤er in our minimalist approach.
The author sides with those who, like recently [6], are dissatised with the
formation of the terms dialetheismand dialetheicon etymological grounds,
to the preference of dialethismand dialethic, and prefers the terms bialethism
and bialethic for usage in characterizing librationism in order to distinguish
the point of view from common expositions of dialetheism which have it that
the latter view is characterized by accepting the truth of some contradictions.
In summing up, librationism may be understood as a parasistent, consistent,
complementary and bialethic theory. Librationism is related to paraconsistent
theories, though it has some very special features which sets it apart from such
approaches. This warrants special terminology.
Instead of having restrictions on syntax, as e.g. in type theory, or, alterna-
tively, weakening classical logic and keeping the naive comprehension schema, as
e.g in certain traditional or hypothetical paraconsistent approaches to set the-
ory (or property theory. . . ), we may instead opt for syntactic freedom, keep
classical logic and weaken the naive comprehension schema. In librationism this
is, as in the ZF-tradition, a central trait of the strategy which is followed. In ar-
ticulating the librationist strategy, we conveniently make use of a truth-operator
in what we may think of as an alethic comprehension schema which we may for
now state as follows:
8x(x 2 fw : Ag  TA(x=w))
Here A is a formula where w may occur free and A(x=w) is the result of
substituting x for w in A. It is presupposed that x is substitutable for w in A.
T is a monadic formula-forming formula operator. Intuitively, we may think of
T as our truth-operator. The sort brackets are used as one should expect. If we
were to conjoin alethic comprehension with the naive truth principle A  TA,
we would of course recover naive comprehension and triviality, i.e. that every-
thing follows, in the context of classical logic. In librationism we instead have
a series of axiom schemas and inferential principles which in sum approximate
the naive truth principle very strongly while avoiding triviality.
The system we isolate is, as pointed out, importantly, contentual (semi-
formal), i.e. innitary proof principles hold, and in that sense it goes beyond
standard formal systems. We focus upon one designated model, and this is
instrumental in isolating the provability verb. We hope that we will give occasion
to appreciate the adequacy of such a move in connection with our discussion of
Curry-paradoxicalities in §11. By adequacy is here meant that our discussion
of the Curry-paradoxicalities reveals that a contentual (semi-formal) approach
is indeed needed in order to deal with paradoxes in a general setting. It turns
out that the Curry-paradoxicality in the librationist framework is transformed
into a metalogical reminder that librationism is negation (negjunction) complete
and so only serves to reiterate that librationism is a contentual system and that
what we present of it must only be understood as a partial axiomatization.
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It is a surprising fact that Cantors reductio argument for the uncountability
of power-sorts of innite sorts does not go through in librationism. Instead,
Cantors reductio argument, which of course is entirely valid, serves to discard
the assumption that there is a non-paradoxical sort s = fx : x 2 N ^ x =2 f(x)g
given a function f from the sort N of natural numbers onto the power sort of
N. Indeed, we may even postulate that there is such a function from N onto the
full universe V of all sorts, and this does not fall prey to Cantors argument.
Also, generally power-sorts are paradoxical in librationism.
As the reader comes to study more details, she or he is encouraged to appre-
ciate that there are, in a certain sense, very few intuitively or pretheoretically
plausible principles of truth which fail. Librationism does not generally have
the naïve truth principle A  TA, but it always has both halves, i.e. both
A  TA and TA  A are (at least minor) theorems. Also, if A is a theorem,
then so is TA, and vice versa. In consequence of the foregoing, transparency, as
it has been recently called, in the sense of having full substitutivity of the sen-
tences A and TA in all contexts, will of course fail in the general case. But such
transparency will hold whenever the sentence A is not paradoxical. Further,
and more subtle, deviations from the naive picture of truth and abstraction are
not pointed out here, but accounted for below.
We have stressed that librationism is a contentual (semi-formal) system sev-
eral times. It at this point seems appropriate to quote from a post by Martin
Davis on the Foundations of Mathematics mailing list on Friday the 16th of
March 1998: For me, it has been clear since I was a boy (a very long time ago)
that an acceptable account of Gödels incompleteness theorem would necessar-
ily take the natural numbers as given in their totality with objective properties
beyond what could be derived in any particular formal system. As my teacher
Emil Post put it (even longer ago): "this ... must result in at least a partial
reversal of the entire axiomatic trend of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, with a return to meaning and truth as being of the essence of mathe-
matics."Seen in such a way, the fact that librationism is a contentual system
is not something which one should too easily hold against it. We suggest on the
contrary.
§1 The formal language
In order to avoid certain complexities in some of our metalogical reasoning we
shall at the outset presuppose a rather austere language in a Polish fashion. An-
other important reason for this austerity is that the Polish formulation brings
to the fore the point that sorts may be regarded as properties. As our primi-
tive alphabet we take the 6 signs in the list v, .,T,8, j,^. The noemata (free
variables) are generated by the clauses: (1) v is a noema; (2) If something is a
noema then that noema concatenated with . is also a noema; (3) Nothing else
is a noema. Instead of using the austere expressions v, v., v.., etc. we
will in our exposition on occasions make use of numerals and write v0, v1,
....., and also we use i, k... etc. to stand for arbitrary numerals. These
are numerals used for metamathematical convenience and not objects which in
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themselves are terms which can be acted upon by quantiers, and we there-
fore use boldface fonts to distinguish. Usually, we will for convenience be using
noemata like x, y, z in the metalinguistic exposition.
The primitive alphabet also contains the monadic formula forming formula
operator T, the dyadic connective or formula forming formula operator j, sig-
nifying the truth function neither-nor, the dyadic quantier or formula forming
noema-cum-formula operator 8 and the dyadic sortier or term forming noema-
cum-formula operator ^.
We use upper case A and B etc. for arbitrary formulas and lower case a and
b etc. for arbitrary terms, though in some exceptional cases we will use upper
case letters for terms (sorts) which are of special interest (e.g. ;, V , N, H). The
formation rules can be stated by the double recursion:
FR1: All noemata are terms.
FR2: If a and b are terms then ba is a formula.
FR3: If A is a formula then TA is a formula.
FR4: If A and B are formulas then jAB is a formula.
FR5: If A is a formula and vi is a noema, then 8viA is a formula.
FR6: If A is a formula and vi is a noema, then ^viA is a term.
FR7: Nothing else is a term or a formula.
All and only terms and formulas are expressions.
Notice that although e.g. vi and vj are considered noemata as taken in
isolation, the austere expression 8vivjvi contains only vj as a noema. The two
occurences of vi in 8vivjvi are variables and not noemata; the one occuring
nearest the quantier is the binding variable and the other is a bound variable.
With these notions we dene the set of noemata of expressions as follows
(we use square brackets for sets as used in the metalanguage):
(vi)=[vi];
(ba)=(a)[(b);
(TA)=(A);
(jAB)=(A)[(B);
(8viA)=(A)n[vi];
(^viA)=(A)n[vi].
We say that a noema vi is present in a formula A i¤ vi 2 (A), and present
in a term a i¤ vi 2 (a). A noema vi occuring in a formula A (term a) is a
variable in A (a) i¤ vi is not present in A (a). A formula A is a proposition i¤
no noema is present in A. A term a is a nomen i¤ no noema is present in a. A
formula A is atomic i¤A is of the form ba with terms a and b. For a formula A
and noema vi we write A(vi) to signify that vi is present in A.
With this terminology, all propositions are sentences and all nomina (pl)
are sort constants. (We do not presuppose that propositions are extralinguistic
entities in the context of our framewok.) However, as it turns out, in librationism
all formulas are sentences and all terms are sort constants. But not all sentences
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are propositions and not all sort constants are nomina. No nomen is a noema
and no noema is a nomen, but both nomina and noemata are sort constants.
All and only terms are sort constants, but some terms, as ^vivjvi, are neither
nomina nor noemata.
The substitution function (_=_) from expressions to expressions has the
following denition:
(a=vk)vi = a if i = k, otherwise (a=vk)vi = vi;
(a=vk)cb = (a=vk)c(a=vk)b;
(a=vk)TA = T(a=vk)A;
(a=vk)jAB = j(a=vk)A(a=vk)B;
(a=vk)8viA = 8vi(a=vk)A if i 6= k, else (a=vk)8viA = 8viA;
(a=vk)^viA = ^vi(a=vk)A if i 6= k, else (a=vk)^viA = ^viA.
We will make use of a su¢ x notation and write A(a=vk) for (a=vk)A. Iterated
uses of the substitution function like (a0=v0)(a1=v1):::(an=vn) should be written
as (a0=v0; :::; an=vn).
We dene the notion a is substitutable for vk in. . . by the recursion: a is
substitutable for vk in vj; a is substitutable for vk in cb i¤ a is substitutable for
vk in b and in c; a is substitutable for vk in TA i¤ a is substitutable for vk in
A; a is substitutable for vk in jAB i¤ a is substitutable for vk in A and in B;
a is substitutable for vk in 8viA i¤ vi does not occur in a or vk is not present
in A, and a is substitutable for vk in A; a is substitutable for vk in ^viA i¤ vi
does not occur in a or vk is not present in A, and a is substitutable for vk in A.
We usually write A(vk) instead of A(vi)(vk=vi) when vk is substitutable for
vi in A, and on occasions simply write e.g. A(a) and A(b), where it is then
understood that they are given by A(vi)(a=vi) and A(vi)(b=vi) for some noema
vi such that a and b are substitutable for vi in A(vi).
We will, as mentioned, later make use of noema signs x, y, z.... to
stand for arbitrary noemata, and also introduce denitions as follows in order
to more conveniently work in the metalanguage as we provide partial axiomatic
and inferential principles and work in the contentual system of librationism.
Parentheses are invoked for punctuation. We use the denitions:
fx : Ag =D ^xA;
 A =D jAA;
(A ^B) =D jAB;
(A _B) =D ( A^  B);
(A  B) =D (A^  B);
(A  B) =D ((A  B) ^ (B  A));
(9x)A =D (8x)  A:
Instead of the applicative Polish expression ba we will in general be using the
standard inx epsilon notation a 2 b. Our reasons for having presupposed the
austere Polish notions lie in the facts that this simplies some of the following
metalogical reasoning and that it brings to the fore that sorts may fundamentally
be regarded as a special kind of properties.
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§2 The model
We now describe the semi-inductive type of Herzberger process which provides
a model that validates our librationist principles. For related descriptions of
this kind of semantics, see [7,11,12]. Our modelling of librationism will, as
announced, contain some additional twists. Let there be a Gödel-coding of our
language so that we have the set of natural numbers which, under this coding,
are codes of formulas as seen at the metalevel. As it turns out that librationism
accommodates more than arithmetic it is strong enough to provide its own
Gödel coding, and so Fm(x), for x is the Gödel number of a formula of the
librationist language, can in the following be regarded both as a statement in
the object language and as a meta statement. We use square brackets to denote
sets presupposed metalogically for the semantic setup, as in [x : Fm(x)] for the
set of Gödel numbers of formulas. We let pAq stand for the Gödel-number of the
formula A. We dene a semi inductive style model (X; j=; e) by a semi inductive
process (X; j=) built upon a given enumeration e (e(0); e(1); ::) of all nomina (i.e.
terms not containing noemata but only bound or binding variables) by a double
transnite recursion on (e.g. von Neumann) ordinals which are taken as given.
For  any ordinal, we require:
P (0) X() = [pAq : Fm(pAq) ^ 9( <  & 8(   < ! X() j= A))]
P (1) X() j= TA i¤ pAq 2 X()
P (2) X() j= jAB i¤ neither X() j= A nor X() j= B
P (3) X() j= ^viAa i¤ a is substitutable for vi in A and X() j= TA(a=vi)
P (4) X() j= 8viA i¤ for all a substitutable for vi in A;X() j= A(a=vi)
P (5) If a = e(i) then X() j= A(a) i¤X() j= A(vi)
Dene:
IN(X; j=) = [pAq : Fm(pAq) & 98(   ! pAq 2 X())]
OUT (X; j=) = [pAq : Fm(pAq) & 9(8(   ! pAq =2 X()))]
STAB(X; j=) = IN(X; j=) [OUT (X; j=)
UNSTAB(X; j=) = [pAq : Fm(pAq)]nSTAB(X; j=)
Denitions:
(i) Limit  covers (X; j=) i¤ for every   ; IN(X; j=)  X()
and X()  IN(X; j=) [ UNSTAB(X; j=):
(ii) Limit  stabilizes (X; j=) i¤  covers (X; j=) and X()  IN(X; j=).
Theorem 0 : (i) There is an ordinal  which covers (X; j=). (ii) There is an
ordinal  which stabilizes (X; j=).
Proof (i): Any member pAq of STAB(X;) will stabilize at HT (pAq)=
the least ordinal  such that for all   , pAq 2 X()(pAq =2 X()). By
Löwenheim-Skolem-style arguments (see [11,19,20]) members of STAB(X;)
will stabilize at a countable ordinal. Any limit ordinal  larger than the supre-
mum of [HT (pBq) : pBq 2 STAB(X;2)] will cover (X,).
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Proof (ii): Let  be the least ordinal which covers (X;). Let [f(n) : n 2 !]
by a trick of Cantor be an enumeration of all elements of UNSTAB(X;)
where each element pBq of UNSTAB(X;) recurs innitely often in the sense
that if pBq = f(m) and m < n 2 !, then there is a natural number n0,
n < n0 2 !; such that f(n0) = pBq. Dene recursively: F (0) =  and F (n+1) =
the least  > F (n) such that f(n) 2 X() i¤ f(n) =2 X(F (n)). We dene
 = [ : 9m9(m 2 ! &  = F (m) &  2 )]. It is obvious that  is a
limit ordinal which covers (X;). It is also clear that if m < n 2 ! then
F (m) < F (n). Since  covers (X;), it su¢ ces to show that pBq 2 X()
entails that pBq 2 STAB(X;) in order to establish that  stabilizes (X;).
Suppose pBq 2 X(). Since  is a limit ordinal, this entails by P (0) that we
for some ordinal  have that
a) 8(   < ) pBq 2 X())
Since F is increasing with  as its range, we will then for some natural
number m 2 ! have that   F (m) < , so that
b) 8(F (m)   < ) pBq 2 X())
Suppose pBq =2 STAB(X;). By our enumeration of unstable elements
where each term recurs innitely often, we will have that pBq = f(n) for some
natural number n, m < n 2 !. It follows that F (m) < F (n) < . From a)
and b) we can then infer that pBq 2 X(F (n)), since we have supposed that
pBq 2 X(). But from the construction of the function F it would then follow
that pBq =2 X(F (n + 1)), contradicting b). It follows that pBq 2 X() only if
pBq 2 STAB(X;), so that  stabilizes (X;).
The least stabilizing ordinal for (X;) is called the closure ordinal for the
process (X;). We henceforth let denote the closure ordinal. Notice that
it will hold that pAq 2 X() i¤ for all   , X()  A. Since all members of
STAB(X;) stabilize at a countable ordinal, the closure ordinal is countable.
In the proof of Theorem 0 we have mainly adapted [7], pp. 391-2. The con-
struction goes back to [11,12]. Notice that we need no boot-strapping policy
in our framework.
We now make the crucial librationist twist in order to isolate the intended
model of librationism. We shift our attention to those formulas (as noemata
serve as names, sentences) A which are such that X() j= T vA. So our
o¢ cial denition of the roadstyle sign is given by  A =D X() j= T vA. It
is a fact that X() j= is maximal consistent in the sense that X() j= B i¤ not
X() j= B. Suppose not  A. It follows that X() j= T  A. But we can
show that X() j= TB  T  B (see LO2M in the next paragraph) and that
modus ponens holds for X() j=, so it follows that X() j= TA, i.e.  A.
So:  A or  A, as announced.
Notice from this that our denition of the roadstyle supports the following
more precise denitions of maxims and minors: M A =D X() j= TA and
m A =D A & v A:
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We again stress that on account of P(5) all noemata name nomina (i.e terms
which contain no noemata but only bound or binding variables), and as a conse-
quence all formulas of librationism are in reality sentences. We will in the main
bulk of what is to follow let that be reected in our terminology.
§3 Axiomschemas and inference rules of librationism
We rst give a partial list of axiomatic principles, presupposing the denitions
introduced at the end of §1. Maximal schemas are indicated with subscript
M , and minor schemas, i.e. schemas which have minor instances, are indicated
with subscript m. We remind that all axiom schemas that follow hold with all
generalizations, so that generalization is not a primitive inference rule. We can
show, however, by an inductive argument going back to Tarski, that generaliza-
tion holds as a derived inference rule relative to theorems which follow from the
axiom schemas presupposed with all generalizations.
L1M A  (B  A)
L2M (A  (B  C))  ((A  B)  (A  C))
L3M ( B  A)  (A  B)
L4M A  8xA; provided x is not present in A.
L5M 8x(A  B)  (8xA  8xB)
L6M 8xA  A(t=x); if t is substitutable for x in A:
LO1M T(A  B)  (TA  TB)
LO2M TA  T  A
LO3M TB _T  B _ (T  T  A  TA)
LO4M TB _T  B _ (TA  TTA)
LO5M T(TA  A)  (TA_T  A)
LO6M 9xTA  T9xA
LO7M T8xA  8xTA
LO8m TA  A
LO9m A  TA
LO10m 8xTA  T8xA
LO11m T9xA  9xTA
The alethic comprehension principle is as follows:
ACM 8x(x 2 fy : Ag  TA(x=y)), if x is substitutable for y in A.
We next point out some salient inference rules for librationism:
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R1 M A & M (A  B)) M B modus maximus
R2 m A & M (A  B))  B modus subiunctionis
R3 M A & m (A  B)) m B modus antecedentiae
R4 M A) M TA modus ascendens maximus
R5 m A) m TA modus ascendens minor
R6 M TA) M A modus descendens maximus
R7 m TA) m A modus descendens minor
R8 Mv T v A) M TA modus scandens maximus
R9 mv T v A) m TA modus scandens minor
R10 M 8xTA) M T8xA modus Barcanicus
R11  T9xA)  9xTA modus attestans generalis
R12 m T9xA) m 9xTA modus attestans minor
R13 m A & m B )mv T v A^ v T v B modus minor
RZ M A(v) for all noemata v ) M 8xA(x) The Z-rule
This list of axiom schemas and inference principles is, we again stress, not
complete, as librationism is not recursively axiomatizable and no such list can
be safeguarded as complete. Moreover, we have aimed at providing a fairly
comprehensive list instead of circumscribing an independent list of schemas and
inference rules.
We have no explicit librationist comprehension principle. However, one may
think of librationist comprehension as being implicitly dened by the sum total
of such principles as librationism provides.
We show how some of the axiom schemas and inference rules are validated
and leave the rest as exercises. §69 in [7] will be helpful on some, but not all, is-
sues as regards other axiom schemas; the inferential principles are all novel with
librationism. Notice well the subscripts in R10-R12 above, as pretheoretically
plausible strengthenings have counterexamples.
LO1M : Suppose  = + 1 is a successor ordinal and X()  T(A  B) and
X()  TA. Then X()  (A  B) and X()  A, hence by modus ponens
X()  B, thence X()  TB. For  a limit, X()  T(A  B) and X()  TA
entails that 8(   <  ) X()  (A  B)) and 8("   <  ) X()  A)
as from some ordinals  and " smaller than . Let =max(,"). Again by
modus ponens, 8(   <  ) X()  B), so X()  TB . It follows that
X()  T(A  B)  (TA  TB) for any ordinal  below . Consequently
X()  T(T(A  B)  (TA  TB)), and so M T(A  B)  (TA  TB).
LO3M : We notice that for =+1 a successor ordinalX()  (TB_T v B).
This follows from the denition of X and  as it entails that X()  B or
X() v B. We show that for limit , X()  (T v T v A  TA). Suppose
 is a limit and that X()  T v T v A. Then for some ordinal  < ,
8(   <  ) X() v T v A). As for all , X( + 1) v T v A only if
X()  A, it will hold that 8(   <  ) X()  A), hence X()  TA.
We have shown that X()  (T v T v A  TA) for all limit ordinals . As
we have that X()  (TB _ T v B) for all successor ordinals , this justies
that X()  T(TB _T v B _ (T v T v A  TA)), from which it follows that
M TB _T v B _ (T v T v A  TA).
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LO5M : For  a successor ordinal this holds trivially as the consequent holds.
Let  be a limit ordinal and supposeX()  T(TA  A). Then for some ordinal
 < , 8(   <  ) X()  TA  A). Suppose there is some ordinal  such
that   < and X()  A; then 8(   <  ) X()  A), so X()  TA.
In case there is no such ordinal , we have that X()  T v A. In either case,
X()  (TA _T v A). So X()  T(TA  A)  (TA _T v A). As  can be
taken as arbitrary below , we have that M T(TA  A)  (TA _T v A).
R2: Suppose m A and M A  B. It follows that X() v TA and
X() v T v A as well as X()  T(A  B). It is straightforward to observe
that  B as A is unbounded under  and (A  B) holds below  as from some
ordinal below it. But we do not have enough information to know whether B is
a maxim or a minor.
R3: Suppose M A and m A  B. We then have that X()  TA,
X() v T v (A  B) and X() v T(A  B). That X() v T v (A  B)
means that A  B is unbounded under . That X()  TAmeans that A holds
as from some ordinal below . As modus ponens holds at all ordinals, this means
that B is unbounded under , i.e. X() v T v B. That X() v T(A  B),
i.e. X() v T v(A^ v B), means that A^ v B is unbounded under . But
so a fortiori also v B is unbounded under , i.e. X() v TB. So  B and
v B, i.e. m B.
R10: Suppose M 8xTA(x). Then X()  T8xTA(x). But then it obvi-
ously follows that X()  TT8xA(x), and so M T8xA(x). Cfr. §11 as to why
R10 cannot be strengthened as we would intuitively expect.
R11: Suppose  T9xA. We then have that X() v T v T9xA, so that
for all  <  there is a , <<  ,such that X()  T9xA. But then,
whether  is a successor or not, there is a  such that  >    and such
that X()  9xA. By P (2) and P (4) it follows that X()  A(a=x) for some
term a substitutable for x in A. So X( + 1)  TA(a=x), and so by existential
generalization we have that X( + 1)  9xTA. So that for all <  there is a
, < < , such that X()  9xTA. It follows that X() v T v T9xA
implies X() v T v 9xTA. This means that if  T9xA then also  9xTA.
As to why we in addition to R11 and R12 cannot have the rule that M T9xA
only if M 9xTA, cfr. §11.
§4 Identity
We are able to justify the following:
Theorem 1 :
(i) X()  TA  TTA
(ii) X()  T v T v A  TA
(iii) X()  T(A  B)  T(TA  TB))
(iv) X()  T(A  TA)  T(TA  A)
(v) X()  8xTA  T8xA
(vi) X()  TA  A
15
Proof: We do (i) and (iv) and leave the rest as exercises. (Notice that all the
isolated principles of Theorem 1 will hold as minor schemas.) (i): Let r be
fx : x =2 xg. From alethic comprehension and universal instantiation we have
that X()  r 2 r  Tr =2 r. As by Theorem 1 (vi) X()  TA  A this gives
us X()  r 2 r  r =2 r, i.e. X()  r =2 r. This gives us X() v Tr =2 r,
and we also get X() v Tr 2 r on account of X()  Tr 2 r  r 2 r and that
modus tollens is respected by X() . X()  Tr 2 r_Tr =2 r_ (TA  TTA)
is an instance of of LO4M . Since X() v Tr 2 r and X() v Tr =2 r we
have that X()  TA  TTA. The reverse direction comes from Theorem 1
(vi). (iv): Assume X()  T(A  TA). Because of LO2M we then have that
X()  T(A v T vA), so by contraposition X()  T(T v A v A). On
account of LO5M it therefore follows that X()  TA _T v A. If X()  TA
it follows, using LO1M , that X()  T(TA  A). If X()  T v A, we
have X()  T v TA by Theorem 1 (ii), and so by LO1M we again get that
X()  T(TA  A). The reverse direction is similar.
We next justify
Lemma 1: M 8x; y(8u(x 2 u  y 2 u)  T8u(x 2 u  y 2 u))
Proof: By logic
M 8x; y(8u(x 2 u  y 2 u) 
(x 2 fz : 8u(x 2 u  z 2 u)g  y 2 fz : 8u(x 2 u  z 2 u)g)).
But clearly M 8x(x 2 fz : 8u(x 2 u  z 2 u)g), so
M 8x; y(8u(x 2 u  y 2 u)  y 2 fz : 8u(x 2 u  z 2 u)g).
Lemma 1 follows by alethic comprehension.
We justify the Substitution Axiom Schema:
M 8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)  (A(a)  A(b))
Proof: Suppose X() v T(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)  (A(a)  A(b))). By
Theorem 1 (ii), X() v T v T(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) ^ A(a)^ v A(b)). From
LO1M we get that X() v T v(T8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)^TA(a)^T v A(b)). By
using Theorem 1 (iv) and Lemma 1, on the other hand, we establish thatX() 
T8x; y(T8u(x 2 u  y 2 u)  8u(x 2 u  y 2 u)). From these it follows that
X() v T v(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) ^ TA(a) ^ T v A(b)). Using LO2M on the
third conjunct, X() v T v(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) ^ TA(a)^ v TA(b)). By
ACM , X() v T v(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) ^ a 2 fx : A(x)g ^ b =2 fx : A(x)g)).
But then also X() v T v(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) ^ 9u(a 2 u ^ b =2 u)), which
is impossible. So X()  T(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)  (A(a)  A(b))), and the
Substitution Axiom Schema holds.
We justify the Symmetry Theorem (given our substitution function it does
not follow directly from the Substitution Axiom Schema but needs separate
consideration):
M 8x; y(8u(x 2 u  y 2 u)  8u(y 2 u  x 2 u))
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Proof: We have that
M 8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) 
(a 2 fz : 8u(z 2 u  a 2 u)g  b 2 fz : 8u(z 2 u  a 2 u)g).
By rearrangement
M a 2 fz : 8u(z 2 u  a 2 u)g 
(8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)  b 2 fz : 8u(z 2 u  a 2 u)g).
As M a 2 fz : 8u(z 2 u  a 2 u)g we use modus maximus and alethic
comprehension to get M 8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)  T8u(b 2 u  a 2 u). From
Lemma 1 and Theorem 1 (iv), M T8u(b 2 u  a 2 u)  8u(b 2 u  a 2 u),
so by a hypothetical syllogism M 8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)  8u(b 2 u  a 2 u).
As the relation 8u(a 2 u  b 2 u) is also reexive and transitive, we presup-
pose the Leibnizian-Russellian denition
Denition (=): a = b =D 8u(a 2 u  b 2 u)
§5 Arithmetic
Denitions:
KIND(a) =D 8x(Tx 2 a _Tx =2 a)
; =D fx : x 6= xg
a0 =D fx : x 2 a _ x = ag
N =D fx : 8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  x 2 y)g
We call a sort a a kind, or kind, if M KIND(a). Following standard notation,
we also set ! =D N:
Theorem 2: (i) M ; 2 N, (ii) M 8z(z 2 N  z0 2 N), (iii) M KIND(N),
(iv) sort-induction: M 8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  8w(w 2 N  w 2 y))
and (v) full induction: M A(;) ^ 8z(A(z)  A(z0))  8w(w 2 N  A(w)).
Proof: (i): This follows from M 8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z 2 y)  ; 2 y)
and alethic comprehension. (ii): By predicate logic 8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2
y)  x 2 y)  8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  x0 2 y) so X()  T(8y(; 2
y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  x 2 y)  8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  x0 2 y)).
So by Theorem 1 (iii) X()  T(T8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  x 2 y) 
T8y(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  x0 2 y)) . Using alethic comprehension
and the denition of N we have that X()  T(x 2 N  x0 2 N). As x was
arbitrary, it follows that X()  8xT(x 2 N  x0 2 N). But by Theorem 1 (v)
we then have that X()  T8x(x 2 N  x0 2 N), so M 8x(x 2 N  x0 2 N).
(iii): From predicate logic we get X()  T(; 2 N ^ (8x)(x 2 N  x0 2 N) 
((8y)(; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  a 2 y)  a 2 N))). Using Theorem 2
(i) and (ii) and the fact that X()  T(A  B)  (TA  TB), it follows
that X()  T(8y)((; 2 y ^ 8z(z 2 y  z0 2 y)  a 2 y)  a 2 N). Using
LO7M , Theorem 1 (iii), alethic comprehension and the denition of N it follows
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that X()  T(a 2 N  Ta 2 N). Using Theorem 1 (iv) we get that X() 
T(Ta 2 N  a 2 N), and so by LO5M we have that X()  Ta 2 N _Ta =2 N.
But a was arbitrary, hence X()  TKIND(N) and M KIND(N). (iv):
Immediate. v): We strengthen an idea of [7] (p. 356). Let A(x) be an arbitrary
sentence and dene A0(x) =D A(;)^8y(A(y)  A(y0))  A(x). We will have by
logic that X()  T(A0(;)^8x(A0(x)  A0(x0))), so from established principles
also X()  T(; 2 fu : A0(u)g^ 8x(x 2 fu : A0(u)g  x0 2 fu : A0(u)g)). Using
sort-induction we therefore have that X()  T8w(w 2 N  w 2 fu : A0(u)g).
As N is kind we obtain that X()  T8w(Tw 2 N  TA0(w)). But this entails,
by LO7M , that X()  8wT(Tw 2 N  TA0(w)), and so, by Theorem 1 (iii),
we have that X()  8wT(w 2 N  A0(w)). Given Theorem 1 (v) it follows
that X()  T8w(w 2 N  A0(w)). By the denition of A0(x) it follows that
X()  T8w(w 2 N  (A(;) ^ 8y(A(y)  A(y0))  A(w))). The unrestricted
induction schema follows by rearrangement.
Theorem 2, with its obvious elaborations, establishes Peano-arithmetic. The
proof that M 8x; y(x; y 2 N  (x0 = y0  x = y)) is facilitated by the regularity
rule for the sort H of hereditarily iterative non-paradoxical sorts, pointed out
in §9.
§6 Manifestation-points and non-extensionality
The following construction goes back to [7], p 78, and, in a related context, [18].
We can isolate a xed-point construction, which we call manifestation-points, as
follows. If we let A(x; y) be any sentence with the noemata shown, we can nd
a term hA such that M 8z(z 2 hA  TTA(z; hA)). Proof: Let < a; b > be the
ordered pair e.g. à la Kuratowski, d = f< x; g >: A(x; fu :< u; g >2 gg)g and
hA = fx :< x; d >2 dg.
The next theorem shows that librationism is a highly non-extensional:
Theorem 3 : Let a =E b abbreviate 8x(x 2 a  x 2 b) and KIND(x) be as
dened in §5. (i) M 9x(KIND(x) ^ x =E ; ^ x 6= ;) (ii) If a is any kind then
there is a kind b such that M a =E b ^ a 6= b
A proof of (i) is by letting A(x; y) be x = y ^ x = ; and considering its
manifestation-point k such that M 8x(x 2 k  TT(x = k ^ x = ;)). Suppose
some b 2 k. Then b = k ^ b = ; and the empty sort ; has a member. So k
is empty, and due to the maximality of identity statements, it is a maxim that
k is empty. Suppose that k = ;. But then clearly ; 2 k, which is impossi-
ble. So k is distinct from ; and maximally coextensional with ;. This is called
Gordeevs paradoxby [7], p. 73.2 Notice that k is kind because of the logic
of identity. The following type of proof of (ii) is credited to Pierluigi Minari by
[7], p. 74. Let a be any kind and consider the manifestation point b such that
2Lev Gordeev has related to me that he had discovered and communicated the same kind
of result based upon combinatoric logic in the context of Explicit Mathematics to Solomon Fe-
ferman and to Michael Beeson around 1981. The result was published with acknowledgement
to Gordeev in [1].
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M 8x(x 2 b  TT((a = b ^ a =2 a) _ (a 6= b ^ x 2 a)). As a is kind also b will
be kind, so M 8x(x 2 b  ((a = b ^ a =2 a) _ (a 6= b ^ x 2 a)). It is now an
easy exercise to verify that M a =E b ^ a 6= b. 
Theorem 4 : (i) There are innitely many mutually distinct kinds coextensional
with ; = fx : x 6= xg. (ii) If a is any kind, then there are innitely many
mutually distinct kinds coextensional with a.
Proof: (i) We extend the idea in the proof of Theorem 3 (i). Write 0 for ; (and
1 for k as in that proof). Write
_
i=n
i=0 (x = i) for the disjunction (veljunction)
of n identities. Our denitions of the kinds are now given by 0= ; and n+1
as provided by the manifestation point of x = y ^
_
i=n
i=0 (x = i). It follows
by identity theory that M 8x(x 2n+1 (x =n+1^
_
i=n
i=0 (x = i)). We show
by an induction that n+1 is kind and distinct from all of 0,. . . ,n. Suppose
b 2n+1. Then b =n+1 and (b =0 or...or b =n). By identity theory b 20 or . . .
or b 2n. But 0 to n are empty kinds by the induction hypothesis. So n+1 is
empty, and kind by identity theory. If n+1 were to be identical with one of 0
to n we would have n+12n+1, contradicting its emptiness. (ii) Exercise. Hint:
Generalize Minaris strategy used in Theorem 3 (ii) in a similar way as the proof
of Theorem 3 (i) was generalized in Theorem 4 (i).3 
§7a and the paradoxicality and innitude of power-sorts
We show the existence of an exotic sort a4 , that virtually all power sorts are
paradoxical and that all power sorts have innitely many members.
Theorem 5 : There is a sort a such that m 8x(x 2a) and m 8x(x =2a).
Hint: Let A(x; y) be x =2 y, and leta be its manifestation-point.
Theorem 6 : If M 9x(x =2 a), }(a) = fx : x  ag = fx : 8y(y 2 x  y 2 ag
is paradoxical.
Hint: Employa and reason semantically
Fora the construction needed to prove Theorem 6 fails, but in that case we will
e.g. for V = fx : x = xg have that m V 2 fx : x ag. The author does not
know of any sort not maximally coextensional with kind universal sorts which
does not have a paradoxical power sort.
Theorem 7 : All power-sorts have innitely many members.
3During the revision process of this paper the author was communicated a di¤erent but
related construction in Theorem 4 of [10] (forthcoming), which gives a result similar to our
Theorem 4 (ii) in the context of fuzzy set theory. This inspired the insight that also Minaris
construction can be generalized.
4å is the minuscule of the Scandinavian letter Å.
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Proof: Let a be any sort. Let b be any of the innitely many kinds coex-
tensional with ; as provided by Theorem 4 (i). For any such b, M b  a and
hence M b 2 fx : x  ag.
For the notion of innitude invoked here cfr. the following paragraph. Notice
that Theorem 7, counter intuitive as it may seem, even holds for nite sorts
including empty sorts. Our librationist results on power sorts conrm, as it
were, predicativist and related scruples about and suspicions concerning power
sets. But in librationism this is made more precise and more general. Power
sorts are accommodated in librationism, but in a sense of the word sense,
power sorts do not make sense; they are virtually always paradoxical. This
does not exclude that there can be inner models where a restricted power sort
behaves non-paradoxically.
§8 Resisting Cantors conclusion
There is no doubt whatsoever that Cantors arguments for the conclusion that
there are uncountable cardinalities are perfectly valid reductio arguments. How-
ever, we have learned from Duhem and Quine and others that in the face of
contrary evidence a theory might many times be changed in various ways. In
the light of librationism the assumption that there may be a function from the
natural numbers onto its power-sort, or indeed, onto the universe itself, does
not need to be discarded in the face of Cantors evidence. Instead, as we shall,
see, a hidden assumption concerning the non-paradoxicality of certain sorts is
discarded in the librationist framework.
We dene some central concepts as they are cashed out in the librationist
setting. A sort f is a relation i¤ M 8x(x 2 f  9y; z(x =< y; z >)). f is a
function i¤ it is a relation and M 8x; y; y(< x; y >2 f^ < x; z >2 f  y = z).
a is a preimage (domain) of a function f i¤ M 8x(x 2 a  9y(< x; y >2 f)).
A sort a is an image (sometimes imprecisely called range) of a function f i¤
M 8y(y 2 a  9x(< x; y >2 f)). We used the indenite article for preimage
and image in the two previous sentences on account of librationisms highly non-
extensional character as borne out by Theorem 4. A function f is a bijection
from preimage to image if M 8x; y; y(< x; z >2 f^ < y; z >2 f  x = y). A
function f is onto a sort a (a surjection) i¤ M 8y(y 2 a  9x(< x; y >2 f)).
Notice that all functions are surjections to their images, given these notions. It
follows that if M a  b and f is a surjection to b then f is also a surjection
to a. A sort a has cardinality n, for n 2 N, i¤ there is a kind bijection from
n to a. A sort a has cardinality ! i¤ there is a kind bijection from ! = N
to a. A sort has cardinality i¤ it has cardinality ! or it has cardinality n for
some n 2 N. A sort a is nite i¤ there is a sort b such that M a  b and b
has cardinality n for some n 2 N. A sort a is innite i¤ for all n 2 N there
is a b with cardinality n such that M b  a. A sort a is unnite i¤ it is
not nite. All innite sorts are unnite, but not vice versa; a sort is properly
unnite if it is unnite and not innite. There are both nite, properly unnite
and innite sorts which have no cardinality: An example of the rst type is
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fx : (x = ; ^ r 2 r) _ ((x = ; _ x = f;g) ^ r =2 r)g for r = fx : x =2 xg. a is
an example of the second type. Examples of the third type are r = fx : x =2 xg
and fx : x  ;g. A sort a is countable i¤ there is a surjection from ! to a. As
it turns out, in librationism all sorts are countable, i.e. none are uncountable.
A sort is listable i¤ it has a cardinality.
Assume there is a function f from N onto the full universe V = fx : x = xg.
We also assume that f is a kind, i.e. that M 8x(Tx 2 f _ Tx =2 f). We
now consider Cantors sort s = fx : x 2 N ^ x =2 f(x)g. Clearly s exists
according to librationism, as all expressible conditions correspond to a sort
according to the librationist point of view. We will writem m f(n) as shorthand
for < n;m >2 f , avoiding the identity sign as is commonly used as there in
librationism are paradoxical functions. The use of the identity sign for the
purpose of abbreviating functional mapping would at best be misleading in
librationism, and sometimes turns out to be just wrong as identity logic holds
maximally in librationism (see below in this paragraph for more on this).
Let numerals stand for nite von Neumann ordinals as usual. Suppose now
e.g. that s m f(8). Since f is maximal we will have that this is a maxim. We
then consider whether 8 2 s. What we obtain from all this and our comprehen-
sion principle ACM is that M 8 2 s  T(8 2 N ^ 8 =2 s). But M 8 2 N, so
this reduces to M 8 2 s  T(8 =2 s). But the available axiomatic principles
and inference rules only license the conclusion that s is a paradoxical sort, and
that we thus have both  8 2 s and  8 =2 s. The assumption that s must
be non-paradoxical is an essential requirement in this Cantorian argument for
the existence of higher cardinalities. In the librationist framework the assump-
tion is naturally discarded, and the Cantorian argument does not support the
conclusion that f cannot exist.
We assumed f to be a kind (non-paradoxical) function from N onto the full
universe of sorts, and noticed that such an assumption can be made without
falling prey to Cantors considerations. It holds, a fortiori, that we may assume
that there is such a function from N onto its power-sort.
Other Cantorian type arguments, including Cantors rst argument, for
higher types of innities fall prey to similar considerations. For example, if
(as is indeed suggested by the present framework) the sort of real numbers (e.g.
taken in a Dedekindian way) is a paradoxical sort, there is no way to collect
exactly all the real numbers by means of a non-paradoxical function from the
natural numbers. The sort of real numbers so taken is paradoxical in the libra-
tionist framework, just as is the power sort of the natural numbers and, indeed,
as we saw, power-sorts more generally. There even are paradoxical real numbers
with such a Dedekindian setup (e.g. fx : (x <Q 0Q^r 2 r)_ (x <Q 1Q^r =2 r)g
with <Q the standard order of rational numbers, 0Q (1Q) rational zero (one)
and r = fx : x =2 xg), and there is no non-paradoxical sort which maximally
collects exactly the non-paradoxical real numbers. The situation is as follows:
If there were a non-paradoxical function from the natural numbers having ex-
actly the sort of (non-paradoxical) real numbers as its range, then the sort of
(non-paradoxical) real numbers would be non-paradoxical. But we can show
that the sort of (non-paradoxical) real numbers so taken, for independent rea-
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sons, is paradoxical. So there is no such function. The sort of real numbers is
not listable. Still, there is nothing which licences the conclusion that there is
no non-paradoxical function from the natural numbers onto the sort of (non-
paradoxical) real numbers, and so in this fundamental and perfectly adequate
sense the sort of real numbers remains countable, i.e. it does not have a car-
dinality larger than !. No sort has a cardinality larger than ! in librationism,
though some, as the sort of real numbers do not have a cardinality. There are
no more real numbers than there are natural numbers.
We have of course not by the foregoing shown that librationism as so far
developed has such a surjection as assumed from N to V . To achieve such a
strengthened countable framework, we enlarge the librationist language with a
new nomen e and have its denotatum serve as a bijection from N to the full
universe by just slightly altering the semantical setup.
We rst change into an enumeration where e is reckoned amongst the nom-
ina. The semantical principle P (5) of §2 is now changed into Pe(5): (1) If
a = e(0) then X()  A(a) i¤X()  A(v0). (2) For successor numerals i + 1,
if there is a natural number n such that for all numerals k smaller than i + 1,
X() v (8u)(e(n) 2 u  vk 2 u), then X()  (8u)(e(m) 2 u  vi+1 2 u)
i¤ m is the smallest number such that for all numerals k smaller than i + 1,
X() v (8u)(e(m) 2 u  vk 2 u). Otherwise X()  (8u)(vi 2 u  vi+1 2 u).
Notice that we in dening Pe(5) have presupposed the Leibnizian-Russellian
denition of identity in §4. We also point out that if we stay with the notation
of Def(=) in §4, one must keep in mind that it is only at very large ordinals of
the semantical process that identity is adequately captured. We e.g. have that
X(0)  8x8y(x = y). But already X(2)  fx : x 2 xg 6= fx : x =2 xg. The
generation of non-identities is monotonous in the external semantical process,
so that if  <  and X()  a 6= b then X()  a 6= b.
Presupposing e.g. a Kuratowskian denition of ordered pairs and N as de-
ned above, we further assume a new semantical principle P (6): X()  u 2e
i¤ for some sort a and some natural number n and noema with corresponding
numeral n, X()  u =< n; a > ^n 2 N ^ a = vn. Our semantical setup is
now such that M KIND(e). This follows from the logic of identity and the
fact that N is kind. It holds that e is a bijection from N to the full universe,
as distinct noemata are now unique standard names for distinct sorts, i.e. all
sorts will have a unique noema as its standards name and all noemata denote a
unique sort. Given this we may also accommodate an appropriate substitution
function and by slight alterations in the semantical setup include also a truth
predicate; we then justify an Axiom of Truth which expresses the appropriate
correspondence between the truth operator T and the truth predicate. The
truth predicate is then best thought of as a sort of natural numbers, and it
is a paradoxical sort. The Liars Paradox and related paradoxes are now ac-
counted for librationistically in a way which at this point will be understood in
its outlines by my audience; we invoke the Carnap-Gödel Diagonal Lemma. We
mention that Yablos alleged non-circular paradox can be accounted for in our
framework.
Given that e is a kind bijection from N to the full universe, an appropriate
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partial function from the natural numbers N onto its power sort }(N) is provided
by f = f< x; y >:< x; y >2e^y  Ng. An image of f will indeed be fx : x 
Ng. For any b, and so also if  b 2 fx : x  Ng, there will be some unique sort
a such that M<a; b>2e. Here M a 2 N. So suppose  b 2 fx : x  Ng
and a 2 N such that M< a; b >2e. By alethic comprehension and modus
descendens we get  b  N. By classical logic and modus subiunctionis then
 (< a; b >2e^b  N). By modus ascendens,  T(< a; b >2e^b  N), and so
by alethic comprehension and the denition of f , < a; b >2 f . The function
f , partial on N, can be seen to be a bijection from e.g. the proper domain
fx : 9y(< x; y >2e^y  N)g to its images.
We show that the function f = f< x; y >:< x; y >2e^y  Ng itself is
paradoxical. To see this consider our sort a dened in §7 which is such that
 8x(x 2 a) and  8x(x =2 a). Given that e is a kind bijection from N to
the full universe, there will be a unique n 2 N so that M< n;a >2e. Since
 a  N it follows that < n;a >2e^a  N by classical logic and modus
subiunctionis. By modus ascendens,  T(< n;a >2e^a  N), and so by alethic
comprehension and the denition of f , < n;a >2 f . Now, since also a 6 N,
it will as well hold that < n;a>=2e_a 6 N. By modus ascendens it follows that
 T(< n;a >=2e_a 6 N). By LO2M and modus subiunctionis it follows that
v T v (< n;a >=2e_a 6 N), so by de Morgan v T(< n;a >2e^a  N). By
alethic comprehension and the denition of f , < n;a>=2 f . So < n;a >2 f
and < n;a >=2 f . f is a paradoxical function. Still, it is a function in that it
is maximally a relation and M 8x; y; z(< x; y >2 f^ < x; z >2 f  y = z).
The fact that there are paradoxical functions conjoined with the fact that
identity statements are always maximally true or maximally false, justify the
symbolical innovation introduced above for the librationist setting.5 As we know
it has been common to write g(a) = b for < a; b >2 g when g is a function.
But this notation is in the librationist framework not advisable, since it, in
conjunction with the librationist theory of identity, would imply that functions
cannot be paradoxical. Instead we suggest to write g(a) m b for < a; b >2 g
when g is a function. If e.g. M< 13;a >2e and f is as in the two previous
paragraphs, we conclude that m< 13;a >2 f and write m a m f(13).
It is conceivable that one could presuppose a librationist framework for deal-
ing with the paradoxes and at the same time retain or cling to the idea that
there are uncountable innities. The author would regard such an approach,
if possible, as quite disingenuous. It is a virtue to postulate as few entities as
possible in order to account for a phenomenon. Given this attitude, we should
not postulate uncountable entities unless we are compelled to. Moreover, the
author does not believe there are uncountable innites. But we are in the li-
brationist framework not compelled to postulate uncountable innities, and we
ought to regard this as a strong advantage which counts in its favour. Here
also the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem is on our side, as it, as stressed by Skolem,
shows that the notion of uncountability is one that we can have only in a very
theory relative sense.
5The author rst suggested this symbolic innovation in [3].
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§9 Introducing hereditarily kind and iterative sorts
We rst report some results without proof. For related results in a di¤erent
formal setting, see [7] §12 and §23. As before, we let KIND(y) abbreviate
8x(Tx 2 y _Tx =2 y).
Given the manifestation-point M 8x(x 2 H  TT(KIND(x) ^ x  H))
it follows that M x 2 H i¤ M KIND(x) ^ x  H. If M a 2 H then a
is hereditarily kind (non-paradoxical) and iterative. (a is hereditarily kind i¤ a
is kind and all members of a are hereditarily kind. We explain our notion of
iterativity below.) From Theorem 2 (iii), M N 2 H. Further, H is closed under
pairing and union, in that if M a; b 2 H then M fa; bg 2 H and M [b 2 H.
H is in fact closed under all the remaining Jensen rudimentary functions.6
F1(x; y) = xny
F2(x; y) = x y
F3(x; y) = f< u; z; v >: z 2 x^ < u; v >2 yg
F4(x; y) = f< u; v; z >: z 2 x^ < u; v >2 yg
F6(x; y) = Dom(x)
F7(x; y) =2 \x2
F8(x; y) = fx00fzg : z 2 yg)
in the same sense, and so also under 0-separation. From §5 we know that the
full induction schema for N holds. Indeed, from the following paragraph we will
see that much more is true.
One should pay attention to the fact that H itself is not kind. For example,
m a 2 H. This is left as an exercise.
We wrote that H is a sort of iterative sorts. This holds in the following sense
of a regularity rule:
If M b 2 H then M 9x(x 2 b)  9x(x 2 b ^ 8y(y 2 b  y =2 x))
We can justify the regularity rule briey as follows: Suppose instead that
M b 2 H and  9x(x 2 b)^8x(x 2 b  9y(y 2 b^ y 2 x)). As b is hereditarily
kind it follows that M 9x(x 2 b) ^ 8x(x 2 b  9y(y 2 b ^ y 2 x)). But the
latter can only be satised if b is circular, a cycle or has an innitely descending
chain. Given the nature of H, it would follow that X(0)  9x(x 2 H), which is
contrary to our minimalist stipulations. Hence, H only contains well-founded
sorts as maximal members.
If M b 2 H we will say that b is a good. Here the word good is used
as a noun, but we also on occasion use it adjectivally. All goods are kinds, but
not vice versa. In as far as librationism supports the existence of sets in a more
classical sense (e.g. as those sorts which belong to a good dened as the least
sort built up iteratively from N=! by closing o¤ with the Jensen rudimentary
functions) such sets will be goods. But not all goods are sets. E.g. extensionality
fails badly for H. For this, see Theorems 3 and 4.
6See [13], especially Lemma 1.8 on p. 239.
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§10 Finitely Iterated Inductive Denitions and Transnite Induction
The notion of a y-positive sentence will be central here, so we dene y-positive
and y-negative sentences relative to goods e of H as follows: If y is not among
the noemata of a sentence A then A is both y-positive and y-negative. The
sentence t 2 y is y-positive. If A and B are both y-positive (y-negative) then
A ^B, A _B, 9x(x 2 e ^ A) and 8x(x 2 e  A) are y-positive (y-negative). If
A is y-positive (y-negative) then v A is y-negative (y-positive).
The theory of nitely iterated inductive denitions ID<! extends ACA0
by least xed-point principles for successively newly introduced set terms. If
A(x; y) has x and y present and is y-positive, let the expression [xyA(x; y)]
temporarily stand for such a new term with x and y bound so that:
FP 8z(z 2 [xyA(x; y)]  A(z; [xyA(x; y)])
LEAST 8z(8x(A(x; z)  x 2 z)  ([xyA(x; y)]  z))
It follows from what we pointed out in §9 that H su¢ ces to interpret ACA.
We will now show that analogues of FP and LEAST can be captured, and
we use manifestation points. Since we are now rst of all interested in the
generation of subsorts of N, we let A(x; y) be of the form x 2 N^A0(x; y), where
A0(x; y) is y-positive relative to (goods of) H. This means that all quantiers
in the build-up of A(x; y) are to be bound by goods in H. All and only good
parameters from H are allowed. We now consider the manifestation-point such
that M 8x(x 2 hA  TTA(x; hA)) and will show that FP and LEAST hold
for hA. We rst consider FP .
It is su¢ cient to show that hA is non-paradoxical, which in its turn is nec-
essary in order to show that M hA 2 H. OBSERVATION: Since hA is an
operator with the indicated restrictions to H, we will for all ordinals  have
that X()  8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA)  8x(A(x; hA)  TA(x; hA)). This follows
from the build up of A(x; y), it being positive in y. We will show rst that
X()  T8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA). If  is a limit below  or  = ; then clearly
also X()  8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA) and X( + 1)  8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA).
Suppose  =  + 2 and that the hypothesis that 8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA)
holds below . Suppose so that X()  a 2 hA. Then X()  A(a; hA).
But by the induction hypothesis, X()  8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA). From
our OBSERVATION, it then follows that X()  TA(x; hA), which in its
turn entails that X()  Ta 2 hA. Hence X()  (a 2 hA  Ta 2 hA).
By a transnite induction it follows that we at the closure ordinal have that
X()  T(a 2 hA  Ta 2 hA), and hence M KIND(hA). Now clearly also
M hA  H, so that M hA 2 H.. It follows as a matter of course that we also
have M 8x(x 2 hA  A(x; hA)), so that we have FP .
We show that hA satises LEAST . Let  be an ordinal equal to or below the
closure ordinal and assume X()  8x(A(x; z)  x  z). Also, let  be larger
than HT (pKIND(hA)q) (cfr. §2), so that X()  8x(x 2 hA  Tx 2 hA). We
rst show by a transnite induction on ordinals  below  that if X()  a 2 hA
then X()  a 2 z. (1) Let  = 0 or a limit. Then in the rst case not
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X()  a 2 hA, so the conditional holds trivially. In the second case, supposing
that X()  a 2 hA, the conclusion follows by the induction hypothesis because
a 2 hA holds at yet smaller ordinals. (2) Let  = 1 or  + 1 where  is a limit
ordinal. In the rst case again not X()  a 2 hA, so the conditional holds
trivially. The second case is similar to the second case under (1), as it, due to
hA being a manifestation point, entails thatX()  a 2 hA. (3) Let  = +2 and
assume that X()  a 2 hA. It follows that X()  A(a; hA). Now, reasoning
at the meta-level, the set [y : X()  y 2 hA] is, by the induction hypothesis, a
subset of [y : X()  y 2 z]. Since A(x; y) is a kind operator positive in y, and
X()  A(a; hA), it follows that X()  A(a; z). But X()  (A(a; z)  a 2 z),
so X()  a 2 z.  was taken to be an arbitrary ordinal equal to or below the
closure ordinal and aboveHT (pKIND(hA)q). If we assume thatX()  a 2 hA
it therefore follows that X()  Ta 2 hA. But if so, X()  a 2 hA for some
ordinal  below , so that by our induction, X()  a 2 z. Putting things
together, it follows that X()  8z(8x(A(x; z)  x  z)  (hA  z)). But 
was arbitrary at or below the closure ordinal and above HT (pKIND(hA)q),
so it follows that X()  T8z(8x(A(x; z)  x 2 z)  (hA  z)) so that
M 8z(8x(A(x; z)  x 2 z)  (hA  z)).
We now rst show that a transnite induction rule, the Bar rule, holds along
good well-founded relations in H. Let = f< x; y >: A(x; y)g, where we shall
assume A(x; y) to be such that M2 H. Instead of < x; y >2 we write
x  y. Dene:
Progr(; B) =D 8x(8y(y  x  B(y))  B(x))
Progr(; z) =D 8x(8y(y  x  y 2 z)  x 2 z)
W (; u) =D 8z(Progr(; z)  u 2 z)
WF () =D fu : W (; u)g
The transnite induction rule, or Bar rule, we show is: M a 2WF () only
if M (Progr(; B)  B(a)). Suppose the contrary X()  Ta 2 WF () and
X() v T(Progr(; B)  B(a)). The rst means that X()  T8z(Progr(
; z)  a 2 z), i.e. that X()  T8z((8x(8y(y  x  y 2 z)  x 2 z)  a 2 z).
The second means that there is an unbounded set of ordinals  below  such that
X()  Progr(; B)^ v B(a). Spelled out this means that X()  8x(8y(y 
x  B(y))  B(x))^ v B(a). But then it follows that X(+ 1)  T(8x(8y(y 
x  B(y))  B(x))^ v B(a)). From LO1M and LO7M we get that X( + 1) 
8x(T8y(y  x  B(y))  TB(x))^T v B(a)). Since +1 is a successor ordinal,
the Barcan-principle (LO10m) holds, so that X( + 1)  8x(8yT(y  x 
B(y))  T8y(y  x  B(y))). Combined with LO2M it follows that X(+ 1) 
8x(8yT(y  x  B(y))  TB(x))^ v TB(a)). As  + 1 is a successor ordinal
and M2 H we have that X( + 1)  (y  x  TB(y))  T(y  x  B(y)).
From this we obtain X( + 1)  8x(8y(y  x  TB(y))  TB(x))^ v TB(a)).
Using comprehension, this means that X( + 1)  8x(8y(y  x  y 2 fu :
B(u)g)  x 2 fu : B(u)g) ^ a =2 fu : B(u)g. But, as we have supposed
M a 2 WF (), X()  T8z(8x(8y(y  x  y 2 z)  x 2 z)  a 2 z), so
we also have that X( + 1)  8z(8x(8y(y  x  y 2 z)  x 2 z)  a 2 z).
Instantiating with fu : B(u)g for z we have a contradiction. So the Bar-rule is
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valid.
If also M WF () 2 H we can moreover show that full Bar-Induction
M8x(x 2 WF ()  (Progr(; B)  B(x))) holds. It is worth pointing out
that M2 H su¢ ces for 8x(x 2 WF ()  (Progr(; B)  B(x))), and so
in combination with the Bar-rule there is little that goes amiss compared with
the strength of full Bar-induction. Nonetheless, it would be of interest to know
whether M2 H entails M WF () 2 H or not. If the answer is no, it would
be of interest to know counterexamples.
Since M hA 2 H iterations of such xed-points are allowed as in the theory
of nitely iterated inductive denitions ID<!. By established results of proof
theory this shows that librationism accommodates  11   CA0 in the sense of
what can be proved maximally in H. Possibly, the precise gauge here is  11 CA
as the condition A(x; y) allows goods from H as parameters.
§11 Closures of Paradox
We have seen how librationism deals with Russells paradox, in that we both
have that  r 2 r and  r =2 r, i.e. m r =2 r for Russells sort r = fx : x =2 xg.
We will now discuss how librationism deals with a selection of other and some
more complicated paradoxes.
The Liars paradox can be treated in a way very much like Russells paradox
if we extend our language with a bijection from N to V and with a truth pred-
icate, as well as with an Axiom of Truth which links the truth predicate with
the truth operator T in the appropriate way.
The Curry-paradox has deservedly captured much attention since its incep-
tion. In librationism it has a somewhat surprising resolution. Let F be any
sentence, and dene c = fx : x 2 x  Fg. LO8m and alethic comprehension
gives us  c 2 c  (c 2 c  F ). But M (c 2 c  (c 2 c  F ))  (c 2 c  F ),
so by modus subiunctionis it follows that  (c 2 c  F ). By modus ascendens
we get  T(c 2 c  F ), and so next  c 2 c follows from alethic comprehension
by modus subiunctionis. So we have that both  c 2 c and  c 2 c  F for any
arbitrary sentence F . Now,  c 2 c being a theorem, it must either be a minor
or a maxim. If M c 2 c, we easily derive that F is a maxim, i.e. M F . If c 2 c
is a minor (m c 2 c), it follows that v F is a theorem. For then also m c =2 c
so by alethic comprehension and modus subiunctionis v T(c 2 c  F ) and
thence by modus scandens and modus descendens,  c 2 c^ v F . By tautolo-
gies and modus subiunctionis, v F . It follows, by parity of reasoning, that for
any sentence F , either F is a maxim, F (and hence also v F ) is a minor, or v F
is a maxim. But in our contentual framework this is perfectly as it should be;
remember our observation that librationism is negation (negjunction) complete
at the end of §2.
We will now discuss a paradoxicality related to an observation in [14]. Let
N as usual be the sort of natural numbers as dened earlier, and let the use of
0 as superscript signify ordinal succession. Let, for any sort s, sN be given by:
fx : 8y(< ;; s >2 y ^ 8z; w(< z;w >2 y < z0; fu : u 2 wg >2 y)  x 2 y)g
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(Remember that extensionality fails in librationism, and w is generally distinct
from fu : u 2 wg.) Let r = fx : x =2 xg, t = fx : x = r ^ x =2 x^ v Tx 2 xg
and > be the usual order on the natural numbers. Let B(x) be the sentence
(x 2 N  9y(y > x^9w(< y;w >2 tN^r 2 w))). If we now for any limit-ordinal
 (under the closure ordinal) consider the limit-ordinal  such that  = + !,
we will (and we leave this as an exercise) realize thatX()  8xTB(x) while also
X() v T8xB(x). So not X()  T(8xTB(x)  T8xB(x)). In consequence
this also claries why only a minor schema of the Barcan-formula can be assumed
in librationism. Now, our construction also reveals thatX() v T v 8xTB(x)
and X() v T8xTB(x). So m 8xTB(x). But also X()  T9x v B(x)
(exercise), so M 9x v B(x). By R4 we now have that M T9x v B(x). Using
modus maximus with LO2M we obtain M v T8xB(x). But then, it is not
the case that  T8xB(x), and a fortiori not the case that m T8xB(x). So we
have that m 8xTB(x) and not  T8xB(x) (and hence also not m T8xB(x)).
Consequently R10 cannot be strengthened in such ways as one would intuitively
suspect. It is with intricacies such as in this paragraph that librationism evades
omega inconsistencies. Importantly, librationism is omega complete, and avoids
the type of omega inconsistency encountered e.g. in the Friedman-Sheard logic
of truth.
Another curious phenomenon arises in connection with the fact that the
inference rule M T9xA only if M 9xTA is not generally valid. To see this,
the reader is left to realize that X()  T9x(x = ;  r 2 r), where r is again
Russells sort. But also X() v 9xT(x = ;  r 2 r), and as a consequence
X() v T9xT(x = ;  r 2 r) by Theorem 1 (vi). So M T9x(x = ;  r 2 r)
and not M 9xT(x = ;  r 2 r) in this exotic case.
The rst paradox to receive attention in the modern mathematical literature
on these was that of Burali-Forti which concerned itself with well-orderings. We
will point out some distinctive features in the way librationism tackles this
challenging paradox.
In order to emulate von Neumann ordinals, we utilize the fact that goods in
H are well-founded, and dene the sort of ordinals by
M 8x(x 2 Ord  x 2 H ^ Tr(x) ^ 8y(y 2 x  Tr(y))).
(Here Tr(x) is short for 8y(y 2 x  8z(z 2 y  z 2 x)).)
Since H is non-extensional, we need to make use of bi-simulation in order
to recapture standard information on good ordinals. Let (global) bi-similarity
u be given by the manifestation point
M 8x(x 2u TT9u; v(x =< u; v > ^8w(w 2 u 
9z(z 2 v^ < w; z >2u)) ^ 8w(w 2 v  9z(z 2 u^ < w; z >2u)))):
Instead of < u; v >2u we write u u v. Dene ab =D 9c(a u c^ c 2 b). For
relations between good ordinals one writes    instead of . We can now
establish e.g. that if M , 2 Ord then M    _  u  _   . Further
principles of ordinal arithmetic similarly depend upon the condition that the
ordinals are good.
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The Burali-Forti paradox is resolved in the context of librationism because
Ord itself is paradoxical and so not good; we e.g. have that m a 2 Ord.
§12 Closures of Mathematical Phenomena
Since librationism is a contentual system which is negation complete, it may
seem somewhat malapropos to compare its strength to formal systems such
as Peano arithmetic and  11   CA. E.g., as librationism accommodates the
omega-rule, as a special instance of the Z-rule, it has no proof theoretic ordi-
nal. Let the information strength of a system S be the set of sentences  such
that  2  i¤ S entails or contains that  and does not entail or contain that
v . A trivial system which entails everything will then have no information
strength, and also a system S which has no theorems will have zero information
strength. Some systems will have incomparable information strengths. Max-
imal consistent sets of sentences have maximal information strength; however,
such sets in the language of librationism cannot preserve su¢ ciently many of our
pretheoretic intuitions concerning abstraction and truth. Librationism is geared
to have as much information strength as possible while also providing a consid-
ered account of theoremhood and paradoxicality which preserves as many of our
pretheoretical intuitions as possible. Its tremendous information strength fol-
lows from its being arithmetically complete and extending Weak König Lemma
which is equivalent over RCA0 to Gödels Completeness Theorem. It follows
from this that any consistent rst order formal theory has a countable model
in librationism. So librationism has greater information value than any con-
sistent rst order formal theory. But such information strength is immensely
obscured, and will also predominately depend upon delicate issues of interpre-
tation. It is therefore of interest to consider revealed information strength as
various formal theories may gain a librationist justication in that manner. Our
discussion in §10 has established that the revealed information strength of libra-
tionism is greater than that of  11   CA0 plus ordinary Bar-Induction. Recent
work of the author suggests, as is to be expected, that the revealed information
strength of librationism will be signicantly increased. Notice that according to
librationism no mathematical problem is absolutely unsolvable.
§13 Concluding Words
We come to closure on something, e.g. grief, when we have come to accept the
reason for our grief and manage to live with the grief without being paralyzed or
made powerless by it. In this way, it seems to the author that librationism o¤ers
a closure in our dealing with paradoxes. We are in the librationist framework
able to accommodate paradoxes and accept their existence without giving up on
highly important inventory of our intellectual heritage, such as classical logical
theorems and means to sustain advanced reasoning. As pointed out in our mo-
tivation of librationisms name, the theory on o¤er here deals with paradoxical
phenomena in a way which o¤ers justice to the shifts in perspectives which are
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involved in our reasoning in such contexts. Importantly, librationism achieves
this without falling prey to revenge paradoxicalities.
Closures in mathematics abound in another sense. Many sets, or sorts in
our context, may be regarded as e.g. the least sort containing this and closed
under that. Our manifestation-points o¤er another way of obtaining similar, or
related, closure. Other constructions available may be regarded in similar ways.
From what we have pointed out, librationism o¤ers an alternative foundation
of mathematics with great potential for closure.
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